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In this paper we analyse the problem of a principal extracting wealth from an agent who is reluctant to part with it and is also better informed than the principal as to the amount he owns. We assume that the principal has a costly means of discovering the agent's wealth. This problem occurs in a variety of contexts. A prominent example is the way income taxes are collected. In this case the taxpayer knows his own income, but the taxing authority does not. Typically though, the tax collector can expend resources to audit the taxpayer. Another example is that of a manager who asks his subordinates to report on the profitability of their divisions. If the output of a division has value to the subordinate, then he will have an incentive to hold back some of the output. Again, the manager can audit the subordinate, but at a cost. Both of these examples can occur in a context where the tax collector or manager has a legitimate claim to the wealth that is being extracted, but the same problems arise for illegitimate appropriation. Consider the situation described by Kurosawa (1970) where a band of brigands assails a peasant village and demands tribute. The brigands can plunder the village, but this can be costly, particularly if the village harbours masterless samurai.
We adopt the following model of this general problem. The principal knows the probability distribution of wealth for the population from which the agent is drawn, but the principal does not know the wealth of the agent. The principal may audit the agent in order to verify his wealth, but this is costly. The principal may choose schedules detailing the amount of wealth to be surrendered according to messages sent by the agent, the probability that each message will trigger an audit, and the amount of wealth to be surrendered in the event that an audit takes place. The agent, treating the policy of the principal parametrically, acts to maximize his expected net income. The principal chooses his policy in order to maximize some function of his revenue and auditing activity. costs can be made arbitrarily small by forcing the agent to pay large penalties with arbitrarily small probabilities if the agent fails to do what the principal prefers. This result is often associated with Becker (1968) and Stigler's (1970) work on the economics of crime prevention. In general, Mirrlees (1975) shows that even when observations are not perfect, it may be possible to approximate (but not attain) full-information optima with incentive schemes that require an agent to pay large penalties with small probabilities We restrict attention to payments that do not exceed wealth. Consequently, approximating full-information optima with large penalties is not feasible in our model. There are several reasons for making this restriction. One is that legal constraints outside the model may limit what the principal can do to the agent. Managers would be barred by the courts from torturing their subordinates. In the U.S., the eighth amendment to the constitution prohibits the government from torturing tax evaders. It will follow from our results that the principal may want to use this punishment even if he doesn't audit the agent, and not reserve it solely for punishing misreporting. We will also be forced to rule out the converse sort of incentives, that is, offering the agent a large reward with a small probability This too can be used to induce any sort of behaviour. This restriction is justified if the principal's resources are limited to what he can extract from the agent.
The last restrictive assumption that we discuss relates to the auditing technology. We assume that an audit discovers true wealth without error. Baron and Besanko (1984) , Laffont and Tirole (1986) , and others present models in which auditing is possible, but cannot be done perfectly.
This work generalizes the recent work of Reinganum and Wilde (1985) , which deals with a net revenue maximizing tax collector who must use a lump sum tax scheme. They show that optimal schemes are deterministic. Scotchmer (1986) analyses a model in which the tax collector can only choose the audit function to maximize revenue, given an increasing tax function and fines which are proportional to the amount underreported.
MODEL
We assume that the wealth of the agent is a random variable taking values in the finite set X = {x1, ... ., x4}. We will sometimes say that an agent is of type i if his wealth is xi The probability that wealth takes on the value xi is hi (hi > 0). We label the wealth levels so that 0?-xl < ... < The function f is called the penalty function. In the event of an audit, the principal returns the payment t(m) and instead collects f(x, m) where x is the agent's wealth. Since we assume that the agent can pay no more than his wealth we limit the principal's choice of mechanism by requiring that there be at least one message m with t(m) ' xl and by requiring that f (x, m) x for all x and m.
Call a mechanism a direct revelation mechanism if its message space is X, the set of types, and say that a direct revelation mechanism is incentive compatible if truthfully stating his wealth is an optimal message for the agent. The next fact simplifies our analysis.
Proposition 0 (The Revelation Principle). Given any mechanism and any set of agent's optimal responses, there is an incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism which is equivalent from the point of view of both the principal and the agent, when the agent tells the truth. This version of the revelation principle is not immediate from standard statements of the revelation principle because the agent can never pay more than his wealth. The revelation principle need not apply to situations in which the set of reports available to the agent depends on his type.2 An incentive compatible direct revelation mechanism in our framework can thus be described by a triple (ti, Pi, fj) i=1 ...n, j= n where ti is interpreted as t(xi), pi as p(xi), and fj as f(xi, xj). That truthfully revealing his wealth is an optimal response for the agent is captured by the inequalities (I -Pi) (xi -ti) + Pi (xi -fi i )( -pj) (xi -tj ) + pj (xi -fij) for all i and all j with tj xi. Note that while the set of such triples (t, p, f) is closed, it is not compact, as ti and f are not bounded below. This may not seem important if the principal's objective function is increasing in t and f but it does matter. The intuition is this. Any solution to the above problem must force agent to want to tell the truth. There are two ways to do this. One is to punish him for lying by setting fj = xi for i $j, the other is to reward him for telling the truth by making f < 0. It may be that a large reward for telling the truth can be offset by a tiny audit probability and thus economize on audit costs. Thus if the principal wants to maximize expected revenue net of audit costs, it might pay to offer large rewards and audit with small probabilities.
Example
The example given in Table I demonstrates this intuition. The example uses three wealth levels and presents a family of mechanisms indexed by ? > 0. Simple calculations show that this mechanism is incentive compatible. Suppose the cost of conducting an audit is 1 unit. Then the expected revenue net of audit costs is 9/ 8-?E/ 8. Note that f2->-oo as ? ->0. Tedious computation shows that 9/8 iS the supremum of expected net revenue and is not achievable by any mechanism.
We could stop here and claim that the "solution" to the principal's problem involves In order to facilitate the discussion, the following way of describing auditing schemes is convenient. Let ri = (1 -pi)ti + pif, the expected revenue extracted from the agent when his wealth is xi and he reports truthfully, and let ui = xi -r,, the agent's expected utility from truthful reporting. The expected gross revenue when the distribution of wealth is h, is then h r. When pi = 0, then f is irrelevant and when pi = 1, then ti is irrelevant. Condition 4.5 embodies the following conventions: if pi = 0, then f = ti and when pi = 1 then ti = xi. These conventions make the statement of the results tidier and clearly have no real force. Denote the inequality xi -ri _ (1 -pj)(xi -tj) by IC (i, j).
EFFICIENCY
Other things being equal, smaller values of pi are better because they reduce audit costs. Call a scheme (t, p,f) audit efficient with respect to h if it is feasible and there is no other feasible scheme (t', p', f') satisfying h * r' _ h * r, p'=c p, and p' $ p. That is, it is not feasible to raise at least as much expected gross revenue and decrease an audit probability without increasing some other audit probability. Call a scheme audit efficient if it is audit efficient with respect to h for every h > 0. We show below that these notions coincide.
Theorem 1 characterizes schemes which are audit efficient with respect to some h.
In order to simplify the statement of the theorem, say that j attracts i, denoted i ->j, if i$j, xi-tj, and IC(ij) holds as an equality, i.e., xi-r1=(1-pj)(xi-tj). The proof of the theorem is tedious and is reserved for the appendix. The first thing to note about the theorem is that the results (5.1)-(5.5) do not depend on h, the probability distribution of agent types. This is not surprising since we deal only with incentive compatible mechanisms. Thus we have the following corollary. Corollary 1. If the scheme (t, p, f ) is audit efficient for some h > 0, then it is audit efficient.
Following
There is another simple consequence of our arguments. Corollary 2. If(t, p,f) and (t', p,f') are audit efficient and p1 >O, then t = t' andf=f'. This corollary is proved in the appendix.
Some of the consequences of audit efficiency are quite striking, others are expected. Result 5.1 says that the higher the realized wealth level of the agent the more he expects to pay to the principal and also the more he expects to keep.
Result 5.2 is quite striking. It implies that for any wealth level, the tax due is equal to the agent's entire wealth (xi = ti), or the principal promises to take nothing after an audit(f = 0) or else the principal never audits that report (pi = 0). (Both xi = ti and f = 0 are possible simultaneously.) As a result, an agent is always at least as well off after an audit (ti_ f ), so that efficient schemes require in effect the giving of rebates (perhaps of size zero) to the agent after an audit reveals that he reported truthfully. The reason for the result in our model is straightforward. When pi is fixed, the principal has two instruments to raise a given amount of revenue, ri, from an agent with wealth xi: the tax, ti, and the penalty, f. Increasing ti while reducing f in a way that holds ri constant is beneficial to the principal because it weakens the incentive constraints IC(k, i). Therefore, the principal can improve on a tax scheme in which f > ti by increasing ti and reducing f. We can construct other models in which an agent would prefer not to be audited.
Specifically, if some types of agent always tell the truth regardless of the incentive scheme (i.e. are honest), but the principal cannot directly observe honesty, some taxpayers could find it optimal to be dishonest in spite of grave consequences if discovered.3 Alternatively, audits could be imperfect and the agents could have different information regarding the probability that the principal will discover a lie. Even so, rebates for truthful reporting cannot be ruled out.
Result (5.3) says that audit probabilities decline with reported wealth and that taxes increase with wealth. That taxes are increasing in reported wealth follows for rather subtle reasons. It is easy to show that the incentive constraints require audit probabilities to increase whenever taxes decrease. This result is true even with risk aversion. It is also easy to see that for the risk neutral case, expected payments ri are increasing in xi (5.la): for ifj > i and rj < ri, then IC(i, k) implies that IC(j, k) is not binding for any k, which by (5.4a) is inefficient. Note that this last part of the argument requires the assumption of risk neutrality. Now suppose that there are income levels i and j with i >j, but ti < tj.
In particular then, ti < xi, so by result (5.2), either f = 0 or pi = 0. Assume for simplicity that both pi and pj are positive, the general case being covered in the appendix. Then the only revenue raised from type i is through taxes, since f = 0. This expected revenue is (1 -pi) ti which is less than (1 -pj) tj, since ti < tj and since audit probabilities and taxes move in opposite directions, Pi _ pj. But the revenue raised from type j is at least (1 -pj) tj which violates the monotonicity of revenue, and so is inefficient. Since the taxes are increasing in wealth, the incentive constraints require that low reported wealth be more likely to be audited in order to keep the agent reporting honestly. A simple consequence of these two results is that a stochastically dominating shift in the distribution of wealth will result in a larger expected net revenue for the principal. The result that the low wealth types are audited more frequently may seem paradoxical, particularly in a tax auditing context. There are two factors that make this more palatable. First it is low reports that trigger audits, not low wealth. This is reasonable because the gains from misrepresentation come from underreporting when taxes are increasing. The other factor is that the probability distribution h can be interpreted as being conditional on observable traits of the agent which are not part of the model. Thus tax collectors can condition on occupation or residential location and then audit low reports for that category of taxpayer.
Part (5.4) of the theorem lists technical results regarding constraints which bind in efficient schemes. Part (5.4b) states that there is no reason to audit reports that are unattractive to other wealth levels; the principal audits to encourage compliance. Part (5.4c) implies that we need only include the incentive constraints that are downward constraints, that is, we need only include IC(i,j) for i j.4 Part (5.4d) states that the set of reports that attracts a wealth class increases with wealth. Part (5.4e) states that the principal need not audit those agents who report the highest wealth level.
The second corollary states that the vector of audit probabilities completely characterizes an audit efficient mechanism that involves a positive probability of auditing. If the probability of an audit is zero for all reports and the minimum of the distribution of wealth (xl) is positive, then there is a continuum of efficient schemes, in which all reports pay a tax t which everyone can afford. This is similar to the result (Myerson (1981) ) that for an optimal auction, the vector of probabilities of winning the prize completely determines the transfers between the players. Part (5.5) has the unpleasant consequence that if any auditing at all has positive probability, then an agent with the lowest wealth level will lose all his wealth. If. this were not so, since only the downward incentive constraints bind, the principal could increase the revenue raised from a type 1 agent. This increased revenue could then be traded off to reduce auditing probabilities. The details of this argument can be found in Lemma 6 of the Appendix. The condition Pi > 0 is to ensure that some auditing is possible. If Pi = 0, then by (5.3a), pi = 0 for all i and no report is ever audited. This can be audit efficient if ti = t < xl for all i. In this case ui > 0 for each i. Such a scheme, while audit efficient, does not raise the maximal expected gross revenue possible for the given vector of audit probabilities. If PI >0, then every audit efficient scheme actually maximises expected gross revenue given the vector of audit probabilities.
It follows from (5.3) that if ti = tj, then pi =pj. This allows an alternate method of implementing a scheme. Instead of asking the agent to report his wealth, the principal could just ask for a payment of whatever size the agent wishes. The principal could announce an audit schedule as a function of the offered payment and a penalty function as a function the offer and the amount of wealth discovered. Formally, given a scheme (t, p, f ) define the schedule If the principal announces that given an amount of tribute t that he will audit with probability p^(t) and that after an audit he will take f(xi, t) when he was offered t and finds xi, then a best response of an agent of type i is to offer ti in tribute. This mechanism is equivalent to (t, p, f) from the point of view of both the agent and principal. This approach seems to be more the norm with brigands than with tax collectors. We summarize the qualitative features of efficient schemes as follows. There is a (possibly empty) group of wealth levels who report low wealths and are always audited. Agents with these wealth levels who make these reports pay all of their income to the principal. There is a nonempty group of high reports that are never audited. The principal audits intermediate reports with a probability strictly between zero and one. We have no results on the behaviour of marginal tax rates for agents who are audited with a probability strictly between 0 and 1 aside from the immediate consequence of (5.1): the marginal tax rate for these agents is strictly between 0 and 1. While we do not have a simple, general condition that guarantees that a revenue-maximizing scheme requires selecting 0 < pi < 1 for some i, these schemes are necessary in general.5 A routine verification, aided by the results in the theorem, shows that the net revenue maximizing scheme for the example is the element in the family that we described in which ? = 1/5. Thus, for the example, Pi = 3/5 and P2 = 1/5 in the optimal scheme.
While the results of theorem are for the most part intuitively appealing and quite consistent with results in related types of mechanism-design problems, we should remark that the results do no go as far as results in similar models and that our proofs, while elementary, are delicate. In particular, unlike the auction design problem (see Maskin and Riley (1984a, b) and Myerson (1981) ), there is no guarantee that the local downward incentive constraints (constraints of the form (IC(i, i-1) ) bind at an optimum.6 The fact that only the downward incentive constraints may bind at the optimum allows us to simplify our problem along the lines of Moore (1984) . However, this type of analysis provides a qualitative description of efficient schemes rather than an explicit characterization of optima.
The assumption. that agents are risk neutral is a particularly strong one. Let us describe which of the qualitative properties of audit efficient programs would hold even if agents were risk averse. The results that we describe follow directly from our proofs for the risk neutral case. We refer the reader to Mookherjee and P'ng (1986) for additional results.7 The result that honest taxpayers prefer to be audited (5.2b) continues to hold and for the same reasons as in the risk neutral case. In general, when the agents are risk averse it is not efficient to push either ti to its upper bound orf to its lower bound. When agents are risk averse spreading out their possible payments is costly. 
SPECIAL SCHEMES
In this section we discuss the relationship between special properties of auditing schemes. A scheme (t, p, f) is lump sum if there is some t* such that f = ti = min {xi, t*} for each i. That is, the principal has a target revenue t*; if t* is unaffordable for the agent, then the principal takes everything. A scheme is deterministic if piE{0, 1} for each i. Reinganum and Wilde (1985) showed that with a continuum of income levels and restricting attention to lump sum schemes, then net revenue maximizing schemes are deterministic. This result requires only slight modification in our framework. The next result characterizes efficient schemes when the principal's ability to make commitments is imperfect. Specifically we consider the case where the only credible commitment is to take everything after an audit, regardless of whether the truth was told.
Proposition 4. If the principal is restricted to schemes in which he appropriates the agent's entire wealth after an audit, that is, if f? = xi for all i, then there exists a revenue maximizing auditing scheme that is deterministic.
When the condition of Proposition 4 is met our problem reduces to a standard mechanism-design problem. In particular, local downward incentive constraints bind; we can use this fact, and familiar arguments (see, for example, Myerson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1984a) ) to show that we can take the auditing scheme to be deterministic. We point out that having the local incentive constraints bind is not of itself sufficient to obtain a deterministic scheme, as our previous example demonstrates.
This result underscores the importance of the ability of the principal to make commitments. Since in general, fi = 0 for some i, the agent must believe that the principal after conducting an audit will be satisfied with taking nothing even after having gone to the expense of an audit. Peasant villagers might never find this a credible promise by a band of brigands because it is ex post optimal for the brigands to carry off everything. If that is so, then the brigands may be forced to use a scheme with f = xi for all i, which is in general not a net revenue maximizing scheme. The brigands then have an incentive to create a commitment mechanism to make the schedules credible. One provocative speculation about how the schedules might be made believable is for it to be common knowledge that there is a strong and vindictive god by which the brigands could swear oaths.9 Another possibility for the brigands might be to create a bureaucracy for the enforcement of the schedules and incentives for bureaucrats which would keep them from making ex post optimal decisions, to the ex ante benefit of the brigands.
APPENDIX: PROOFS Proof of Necessity in Theorem I
In order to prove necessity in Theorem 1 it is convenient to reformulate the problem. Set q, = ( -p,), the probability that the report xi is not audited (and hence the payment is ti). 
and thus qiti = r, = tk >-t,
where, in (5), the first equality follows from (1), the second equality from (4) 
with equality for some i> T. However, the right-hand side is independent of i for i> T because of (1) Let (r, t, q) be feasible and satisfy (5.la), (5.2a), (5.3a), (5.4a, b, d) , (5.5). Then it is audit efficient.
